The philosophical arguments which constitute this book [The Concept of Mind] are intended not to increase what we know about minds but to rectify the logical geography of the knowledge we already possess.and also:
[t]here were reasoners before Aristotle and strategists before Clausewitz. The application of rules of reasoning and strategy did not have to await the work of their codifiers. Aristotle and Clausewitz were, in fact, only able to extract these rules, because they were already being applied.This thought also echoes Quintilian who had asserted while demarcating his (heuristic) rules for framing arguments and discourses that:
... the discovery of arguments was not the result of the publication of text-books, but every kind of argument was put forward before any rules were laid down, and it was only later that writers of rhetoric noted them and collected them for publication...The creators of the art were therefore the orators, though we owe a debt of gratitude also to those who have given us a short cut to knowledge (per quos labor nobis est detractus). (Institutio, V, x 120-121)
References:
Tanney, Julia, "Gilbert Ryle", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/ryle/>
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