John Milton
Art of Logic
Book II, Chapter XVII
METHOD is a dianoetic disposition of various homogeneous
axioms arranged one before another according to the clarity of their nature, whence
the agreement of all with relation to each other is judged and retained by the
memory.
There is very great use of method in all life, therefore
great glory is given to it. Plato in the Philebus says that it is "a gift
divinely given to men." Aristotle also numbers "order among the
greatest goods." Fabius writes: "They do not seem to me to err who
think that the very nature of things stands in order, and that if order is lost
everything will perish."
Method, then, is a disposition of various homogeneous axioms,
that is, of those which pertain to the same thing, and are referred to the same
end. If they were not homogeneous, they could not be mutually subordinate to
each other, therefore could not be at all ordered. So method excludes
arithmetic in geometry, and geometry in arithmetic as heterogeneous and alien. Axioms
are to be arranged one before another according to the clarity of their nature,
as they express arguments that are prior, better known, and clearer. It makes
little difference whether prime arguments or arguments derived from primes precede,
since both have the same affect.
So as truth or falsity is seen in the axiom, in the
syllogism consequence and inconsequence, so in method care is taken that what
is clearer in itself should precede, what is more obscure should follow; and in
every way order and confusion are judged. Thus the first in absolute idea of
the homogeneous axioms is disposed in the first place, the second in the second,
the third in the third, and so on.
The prior as well as the posterior we speak of in five modes.
First is that of time, as an old man is before a youth. Next is that of nature,
as a cause is before an effect, a genus before a species. Then comes whatever
is before in consecutiveness of existing, that is, what is given when something
else is given, and which when it is given does not require that another be
given, as unity in relation to something consisting of two; for sometimes where
there is reciprocal consecutiveness a thing is before by nature which is
simultaneous in time, as the sun in relation to its light. That which is before
by nature is also spoken of in two ways; a thing may be before in production, as
the parts are before the whole, the simple before the composite, the means
before the end; or it may be before in intend on, as the whole is before the
parts, the compound before the simple, the end before the means. Fourth, anything
is prior in disposition or place which is nearer the beginning, as in speaking
narration is before confirmation, or something may be before in dignity, as the
magistrate to the citizen, gold to
silver, virtue to gold. Finally, a thing is prior in cognition which is easier
to grasp, either in itself or in us—in itself because it is before by nature, in
us because it is later and presented to the senses; the first is more perfect
cognition, the second less perfect.
So method continually progresses from universals, as those
which contain causes, to particulars. Indeed from antecedents in every way and
absolutely more known one must proceed to unknown consequents.
Thence it is to be understood that here is treated the
method of presenting or teaching, which is properly called analytic, not the
method of inventing. For the method of inventing which by Plato is called
synthetic proceeds from single things which are before in time and first offer
themselves to the senses; by induction from these general notions are collected;
but the method of teaching or of disposing what have been invented and judged
is the subject of this section. A contrary way, as Aristotle (Metaphysics i. i
and 2) teaches, proceeds from universals, which by nature are before and better
known; not since they are known first or more easily, but because after they
are known they have precedence by the nature and clarity of the notion in
proportion as they are more remote from the senses. Thus the general species of
things (as the opticians also teach) strike the senses more quickly than
particulars, as when something is coming I judge it is an animal before I judge
it is a man, and a man before Socrates. Aristotle in many passages teaches this
as the only method.
But the examples of sciences and arts especially
demonstrate and especially defend unity of method.
In these all rules should be
general and universal, yet their grades arc distinguished, and in proportion as
any one is more general it will the more take precedence.
The most general will
be first in place and order, since it is first in light and knowledge.
The
subaltern follow, since they are next in clarity; and of these the ones better
known by nature are put first and the less known are ranged beneath.
Last are
put the most restricted.
So definition as the most general will be the first, because
it contains the causes; the consectaries will be subjoined to the definition; or
distribution will follow the explications of the proprieties, if there are some
and they are not clear of themselves from the definition.
If this is multiplex,
partition into integral parts will precede, and division into species will
follow. On the other hand, the parts themselves and the species are to be
treated and defined in the same order in which they have been distributed.
And
if a rather long explication intervenes between these, they are to be joined
together by bands of transition, for this restores and refreshes the hearer.
A
transition is either perfect or imperfect. One is perfect which briefly shows
both what has been said and what follows, as does the beginning of this second
book: "Up to this point has been treated the first part of the art of
logic" etc. An imperfect transition is that which shows in some other way
merely what has been said or what follows, such as that at the beginning of
book i, chapter : "Simple arguments are as I have said" etc.
Grammar
may be taken as an example. Its definition, since that is the most general rule
of an art, according to the law of method should be determined in the first place;
to wit, it is the art of using words correctly; in the second place will be the
partition of grammar into etymology and syntax; then etymology, which deals
with words, should be defined; then should follow the parts of a word in
letters and syllables, and species in words with number and without number, and
the transitions of the terminations should be collected in their places; and
thus also the definitions of all the parts of etymology, the distributions, the
connections, and finally the most special examples in single instances will be
arranged; and in syntax the same thing will be done. All the arts have set for
themselves this course.
The moderns indeed set up a double method, the
synthetic and analytic, as more fit for teaching the theoretical sciences, for
example physics or mathematics; by this method parts of the science are so
disposed that there is progress from the universal subject of contemplation to
particulars, from the simple to the composite. Thus physics sets out from the
definition of a natural body; then there is progress toward its causes or parts
and general doings and then to the species. They define the analytic method as
that by which the parts of a practical science are so disposed that from the
notion of the end progress is made toward the notion of beginnings or means, for
the sake of understanding that end; thus in ethics progress is from the end, to
wit, beatitude, to the means, namely, the virtues. But since both of these
methods proceed in one and the same way, that is, from a very general
definition—whether that contains a subject or a general end—to a less general, from
the more known to the less known, from the simple to the composite by dividing
equally on both sides, it does not seem that on account of a diverse mention in
the general definition, there of the subject, here of the end, a double method
is constituted, but rather that the method of teaching the arts is to be called
one and that analytic.
Method is also applied not merely to the material of the
arts and doctrines, but to all things which we wish to teach easily and
perspicuously.
Therefore the poets, orators, and all writers of every sort, as
often as they set out to teach an auditor, wish to follow this course, though
they do not always move in it and insist on it.
Thus in the Georgics Vergil
distributes the matter before him into four parts, as was said above; in the
first book he deals with general matters, as astrology, and meteorology, and
discusses cornfields and the cultivation of them, which was the first part of
the work; then at the beginning of the second book a transition is used:
Thus
far of tillage, etc.
Then he writes generally on trees, next specially on vines.
So in the entire work he endeavors to put first the most general, in the middle
the subaltern, and the most special in the last place.
In the Fasti Ovid also
uses the advantages of this disposition. At the beginning he sets forth the sum
of his work:
I'll sing of times that pass throughout the year, etc.
Having made
his invocation, he next lays down the division of the year. Then having
interpreted the common differences between holiday and working day, etc., he
goes through each month in its place, and in his preface indicates his liking
for this order from general to special:
I say these things for the whole
calendar But once, not to break of? my further course.
Orators in the
introduction, narration, confirmation, and peroration affect this order, and
call it the order of art and nature and fact, and commonly follow it closely.
In
his In Verrem Cicero does this, first in laying down, then in distributing; he
writes: "Thou hast been quaestor this fourteen years since Cnaeus Papyrius
was consul, and I accuse thee of all things which thou hast done from that day
to this" etc. Here is the proposition with the definition of the chief
matter, as the most general thing in this judgment. The partition follows:
"All these years, etc. And therefore into these four parts my whole
accusation shall be parted." These four parts and the small parts of these
parts he then treats, each in its order and place, and binds together with
transitions, the first three in the third book, and so on.
This then will be
the method in diverse homogeneous axioms known either by their own judgment or
by that of the syllogism, as often as a thing is to be clearly taught. But when
the auditor is to be allured with pleasure or some stronger impulse by an
orator or a poet—for they commonly ma\e that their chief concern—a crypsis of
method will usually be employed; some homogeneous axioms will be rejected, as
the lights of definitions, partitions, and transitions. certain heterogeneous
axioms will be taken up, as digressions from the fact and lingerings on the
fact. And especially the order of things will be inverted.
But their own doctrine
of method is to be turned over to the orators and poets, or at least to those
who teach oratory and poetics.
Translation by Allan H. Gilbert
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